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Daily, in the popular press, politics, and academe, we read and hear 
about environmental consequences of the combined effects of population 
growth and per capita consumption (e.g., Durning, 1994; Mello, 1994; 
MacKellar & Hatcher, 1994). The Limits to Growth study of 1972 argued 
that current growth trends would reach serious limits, but that it was possi- 
ble to alter patterns and "establish a condition of ecological and economic 
stability that is sustainable into the future." Since then, a number of envi- 
ronmentalists and political leaders have adopted sustainable development 
as a goal. The Brundtland Report in 1987 defined sustainable development 
as "development that seeks to meet needs and aspirations of the present 
without compromising the ability to meet those of the future." 
Concepts of "sustainability," though they vary in details, always con- 
cern interactions of population numbers and resource use levels. When the 
"Northern" and "Southern" nations squared off at the Rio Conference in 
1992, each side made valid points in the sustainability debate. A popula- 
tion's total impact on any environment is a combined effect of the number 
of individuals consuming (often seen as a problem of less developed na- 
tions, with high population growth rates) times the per capita consumption 
rate and the impact of consumption technology (problems of developed 
nations). Although what contributes most urgently to any particular prob- 
lem will vary, ignoring either population numbers or per capita consump- 
tion can lead to incomplete analysis and misdirected action. 
Thirty years ago, population growth was seen as the major problem in 
sustainable development. Many scholars felt that demographic transition 
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theory (which noted that fertility tended to fall with industrialization in 
Europe in the nineteenth century) predicted a relatively easy path to reduc- 
ing population growth through the simple spread of industrialization. Per 
capita consumption was not considered in early analyses; recognition of its 
relevance to sustainability is recent. Demographic transition theory has not 
proved to be as robust as we had hoped in predicting when and how fast 
fertility is likely to fall (e.g., Coleman & Schofield 1986): industrialization 
in the developing world sometimes proceeds without fertility declines (Ko- 
rea), and sometimes occurs after fertility declines (e.g., Thailand; Knodel et 
al, 1990). Further, fertility declines have routinely been accompanied by 
increases in per capita consumption. 
Why? Here I will argue that in the evolutionary history of all living 
things, "more" has always been reproductively more profitable--either 
more babies, or better-provisioned (more consumptive) babies. This dis- 
tinction is crucial: the most successful reproductive tactic in many environ- 
ments is not to make the maximum number of offspring, but to make fewer, 
better-invested offspring. When lowered fertility produces greater lineage 
success through fewer, better-invested children (MacArthur & Wilson, 
1967; Low, 1993a; Low et al, 1992; Low & Clarke, 1991; Voland, 1984; 
1989; 1990), lowered fertility produces no solution to the population-con- 
sumption dilemma. Several scholars estimate that a child raised in the de- 
veloped world today consumes 15 times the amount used by a child in the 
less-developed world. When this is true, a two-fold decrease in fertility, 
accompanied by a fifteen-fold increase in consumption, does not bode 
well for our ecological future. We need a new approach to understanding 
the relationships among resource consumption, fertility, and sustainability. 
BEHAVIORAL ECOLOGY OF FERTILITY AND 
CONSUMPTION: WHY THERE ARE PROBLEMS 
A behavioral ecological perspective provides new insights into the 
biological reasons why high fertility and consumption, the core of our sus- 
tainability difficulties, are hard to reduce. Behavioral ecology assumes that 
behavior is the product of genes and environment interacting. The relative 
importance of each may differ, and in fact we have little idea of the genetic 
components of most behaviors, in humans or in other species (e.g., Grafen, 
1984). Behavioral ecology simply asks whether we can predict the kinds of 
behavior that are likely to be common, if we know about environmental 
conditions (including social conditions), and about how those conditions 
change actors' genetic costs and benefits. 
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Behavioral ecology, when applied to humans for the purposes of gen- 
erating hypotheses, uses the central paradigm in biology: first, humans, like 
other living organisms, have evolved to maximize their genetic contribu- 
tion to future generations through producing offspring and assisting non- 
descendant relatives; second, the particular strategies accomplishing such 
maximization will differ in specifiable ways in different environments; and 
finally, just as for other mammals, these strategies will typically differ be- 
tween the sexes. All living things have evolved to acquire and use re- 
sources for survival and reproduction. The ways they do so are constrained 
by ecological conditions. Ceteris paribus, those individuals using efficient 
strategies leave more offspring in the next generation than their competi- 
tors. Efficient resource use for reproductive ends has been profitable for 
humans, too (e.g., see Hawkes, this volume; Low, 1993a). 
There are four substantive areas in which behavioral ecology makes 
new or unexpected, testable predictions: [1] relationships between fertility 
and resource acquisition or consumption, and [2] how these relationships 
differ between the sexes, [3] how evolved genetic interests complicate so- 
lutions to large-scale problems, and [4] how evolutionarily novel environ- 
ments complicate solutions to large-scale problems. 
[1] Consumption and Fertility Patterns 
When resources are extremely scarce, fertility for both sexes declines; 
there simply may not be enough calories to maintain the body and repro- 
duce (a modern voluntary equivalent is amennorhea in women distance 
runners). More resources typically mean more, and better-provisioned, off- 
spring. But were we to ask the first ten people we encounter what relation- 
ship, if any, exists between wealth and fertility today, I would bet that the 
answers would be "no relationship" or "a negative relationship" ("it's the 
poor who have the most kids") rather than a positive one. How do these 
relationships actually play out across societies? 
For men in traditional hunter-gatherer and agricultural societies, re- 
sources and status do indeed lead to proximate success and greater repro- 
duction. Results from contemporary societies are mixed (Low et al., 1992). 
Transnational data (Birdsalf, 1980) show a negative aggregate relationship: 
more infants are born per thousand women in poor countries than in 
wealthy countries. Studies using proxy measures (years of education, for 
example) rather than actual resource control, and some census data using 
aggregate patterns (e.g., P6russe, 1992) also find negative results (reviewed 
by Low & Clarke 1992). But studies which examine lineages (e.g., Mueller, 
1991; Low, 1989a; 1990a; 1991; 1994a; Low & Clarke, 1992; Hughes, 
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1986), individual patterns (Rank, 1989), and some census data (Daly & 
Wilson, 1983:334) tend to find a positive correlation between wealth and 
fertility (but see Kaplan et al. in press). Today, contraception technology 
complicates the issue. The functional basis of resources leading to fertility 
probably has not changed; when sexual access, rather than fertility, is mea- 
sured, richer men today clearly have more sexual access than poorer men, 
even in societies in which the resources-fertility relationship is absent or 
negative (P~russe, 1992). 
A critical variable for predicting fertility is whether a child's eventual 
effectiveness in obtaining resources requires heightened investment (espe- 
cially monetary) by parents in individual children. When it does, we pre- 
dict declining fertility, but when it does not (in many proto-industrialized 
and other labor markets using unskilled labor), fertility decline is not ex- 
pected. Such predictions are consistent with Knodel et al.'s (1990) finding 
that as education increases, fertility declines. Thus, even though the gen- 
eral pattern reported across countries is that fertility declines with increas- 
ing GNP, within such societies or social groups, when men's fertility is 
considered, fertility typically increases with increasing resources (above). 
In Birdsall's (1980) analysis, for example, within the countries for which 
she had data, the richest fifth of families never had lower total fertility than 
the poorest f i f th--and they had far greater resources available for each 
child. In other words, increasing GNP is probably simply a correlate of 
cultural/technological/economic changes that result in a requirement for 
increasing investment in individual children to ensure their success.' 
There exists a wealth of supporting evidence from biological studies, 
that, while simplistic in the context of human societies, may be useful. 
MacArthur and Wilson (1967, pp. 145-150), in examining the role of con- 
specific competition (i.e., competition among members of the same spe- 
cies), noted a potent change in the direction of natural selection, depend- 
ing on the density of conspecific competitors. They argued that, when the 
density of conspecific competitors was low, selection favored "produc- 
tivity," and the competitive efficiency of offspring was relatively unimpor- 
tant to their eventual success. Under such circumstances, parents did best 
who simply maximized their fertility. As the environment filled up with 
competitors (a comparatively dramatic process on small islands, the focus 
of their investigation), selection shifted to favor the production of more 
competitive (better-nourished, better4aught) offspring, at the expense of 
number of offspring. As this occurred, parents did better who shunted re- 
sources into offspring investment, even at the expense of offspring num- 
bers. Net lifetime reproduction was enhanced not by high fertility, but by 
lowered ferti l i ty--producing fewer but better-invested offspring. MacArthur 
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and Wilson named these two conditions "r" and "K" selection, after the 
areas of the logistic curve at which we would predict these conditions to 
be manifested. Something of an ecological fad followed, with wide misuse 
of the theory, so that whole species were sometimes described as r- or 
K-selected, muddling the important central question: What is the compara- 
tive advantage to parents of better-invested, highly competitive offspring 
versus more numerous offspring? Darwin (1871 : Vol. 1, 319) himself found 
this question central: 
The only check to a continued augmentation of fertility in each 
organism seems to be either the expenditure of more power and 
the greater risks run by the parents that produce a more nu- 
merous progeny, or the contingency of very numerous eggs and 
young being produced of smaller size, or less vigorous, or sub- 
sequently not so well nourished. 
In nonhuman species, the ecological and life-history responses to this se- 
lection are relatively simple. For example, small organisms, with high or 
uncertain adult mortality and thus uncertain ability to give effective paren- 
tal care, are likely to produce larger numbers of offspring than organisms in 
which adults are relatively safe and long-lived. Organisms with "safe" par- 
ents and uncertain food supplies, and those in which parental teaching 
affects offspring effectiveness (e.g., vertebrate predators), have fewer off- 
spring than those in which parental investment is less effective. 
Across species, these patterns seem to be of relatively little help in 
formulating theory. But consider the diversity within human societies, 
which in fact corresponds to MacArthur and Wilson's original argument. In 
many traditional societies, with few or no medical facilities, fertility is by 
far the strongest correlate of net lifetime reproductive success, and in such 
societies men typically strive for resources and status, using these directly 
in reproductive ways; in fact, the training of boys in these societies is re- 
lated to their potential reproductive gains from striving. 
On the other hand, complexities in either the ecological or the social 
environment that result in increased effectiveness of parental investment 
should result in more investment, at the expense of fertility itself (see Kap- 
lan 1995, who explores this specifically in the market economy context). 
The degree of this shift should be influenced by resource richness: if re- 
source richness increases as the importance of investment increases, the 
negative impact on fertility will be moderate; if resource richness decreases 
as the importance of investment increases, the negative impact on fertility 
wil l be severe. The extent to which we can predict fertility shifts as a result 
116 
POPULATION AND ENVIRONMENT 
of changing economic conditions or purchasing power wil l  depend on a 
number of factors, but especially on how much parental investment assists 
individual children. In many cases, this may hinge on whether individuals 
are wage- or market-dependent. Resource differentials, opportunities for 
better-educated children, and migration options in less developed nations 
are also important. In less developed countries, we may find that as re- 
sources begin to decrease, the risks of migration will be perceived as less 
onerous. Out-migration seems likely to increase if it can offer individuals 
an alternative to decreasing fertility. 
Existing evidence suggest that human fertility decisions arise from indi- 
vidual self-interest (not even conscious); yet demographers frequently as- 
sume rationality and concern for the population (e.g., Coale, 1986, p. 7; 
Wrigley, 1978; Dup~quier, 1972; Schofield, 1976; Viazzo, 1990). Strate- 
gies that enhance individual success wil l  always be favored by natural se- 
lection, regardless of their effect on others and on the population (e.g., 
Fisher, 1958; Williams, 1966; Dawkins, 1982; 1989; Daly & Wilson, 1983; 
Krebs & Davies, 1991). Thus, the apparent "regulation" of human popula- 
tions is an emergent phenomenon (Low, 1993a; Low et al., 1992), because: 
[1] many families, differing in their resources, attempt to optimize their 
own fertility in varying conditions, or [2] subgroups impose legal or reli- 
gious coercion. These two fertility responses are functionally quite differ- 
ent. The extent to which restrictions impose costly constraints on individ- 
ual optimization may predict the extent to which individuals will resist 
them (e.g., China's one-child policy). It would be rewarding to explore 
empirically when fertility shifts arise from ordinary selection, versus coali- 
tion-imposed fertility shifts. Yet we must distinguish among these func- 
tionally different patterns. Recently Hawkes and Charnov (1988; see also 
Botkin, 1990) have cogently summarized the arguments. 
Thus, I think we have a muddle in current thought about fertility, 
wealth, and consumption, and how these relate to sustainable develop- 
ment; probably several things contribute. First, quite different things may 
be measured and inappropriately compared. Aggregate national compari- 
sons such as TFR (total fertility rate) and GNP/capita (gross national prod- 
uct per capita) have additional problems. In the biological comparisons, 
variance is critical; aggregate measures such as GNP and TFR mask all 
variance. Further, TFR, for example, is the total number of children that 
would be born per thousand women if all women lived all the way 
throughout their reproductive lifetimes and had the average number of 
children at each age; it thus ignores both infant and women's mortality 
(both of which are higher in poorer countries--no wonder fertility looks 
higher there). What measure is appropriate depends on the questions we 
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wish to ask, and we have, in the past, paid insufficient attention to this 
problem. 
Second, if individual fertility is shaped by natural selection to respond 
to ecological conditions such as fluctuations in resources, then population 
patterns should be correlated with external conditions. Fertility patterns in 
noncontraceptive societies in fact make ecological sense (see Low, 1993a); 
and the nineteenth century European decline in fertility called "The" de- 
mographic transition was in fact variable, and dependent on local resource 
conditions (Low et al. 1992), for the reasons reviewed above. It may be 
true that, other things being equal, greater fertility means greater lineage 
success; yet "other things" are seldom "equal." Conditions in which in- 
creased investment in individual children enhances their competitive- 
ness--their ability to survive, marry, and reproduce--favor parents who 
shift resources from production of further children to additional investment 
in existing children (Low, 1993a). Unless there is a net increase in total 
resources, the allocation of available resources must be into fewer children 
(e.g., lower fertility, higher lifetime success; Rogers, 1990; 1992). Thus, if 
parental resources can reduce mortality, or make children likelier to get 
established and marry, lower fertility and higher per-child investment (e.g., 
in education) will be favored. Lowered infant mortality, leading to in- 
creased population density (and increased competitiveness; MacArthur & 
Wilson, 1967), and industrialization are often cited as "causes" of the de- 
mographic transition. Neither is either necessary (e.g., Knodel et al., 1990) 
or sufficient to produce a decline in fertility. There are many conditions 
that can make it more expensive to produce effective, competitive children 
(Low et al., 1992; Low & Clarke, 1992). 
Perhaps because of the costliness of children, people make conscious 
decisions about fertility versus investment. Families in modern societies 
make deliberate decisions about family size in response to their judgment 
of available resources (Freedman & Thornton 1982; Johnson & Lean, 
1985); when deliberately-chosen family sizes are considered, income and 
family size are positively correlated. Accidental pregnancies complicate 
the picture. When people judge their income as favorable compared to 
others, fertility increases (Freedman & Thornton, 1982; Johnson & Lean, 
1985; Turke 1989); women on welfare (Rank, t989) clearly avoid further 
pregnancies in order to invest more effectively in existing children. In fact, 
as Lancaster and Lancaster (1987) argue, perception of resources has prob- 
ably influenced fertility decisions throughout human evolution. 
In evolutionary terms, children are a net cost economically, and a net 
benefit genetically. What if, as some economic demographers (e.g., Cald- 
well, 1976; 1983) argue, children were also a net economic gain for par- 
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ents in pre-industrial and pre~demographic transition societies? So far, all 
analyses of actual data suggest that although the situation is complex, chil- 
dren's labor is never sufficient to result in a net caloric/economic gain to 
parents (Turke, 1989; 1992; Kaplan, 1995). Parents provide for their chil- 
dren, even in societies in which children provide some work; even grand- 
parents provide for their grandchildren (e.g., Turke, 1988; I-lawkes et al., 
1989). If children were perceived by parents as producers in agricultural 
work, not only land owners but land workers should have higher fertility. 
Yet this is not true where it has been studied; only land owners typically 
have higher fertility and larger resulting families no matter what the eco- 
nomic times; and landowners' family size shows less variance than that of 
nonlandowners (Low & Clarke, 1992; Pfister, 1989a; b; Cain, 1985; 
Mclnnis, 1977; Hayami, 1980; Hughes, 1986; Voland, 1990). 
[2] Our Mammalian Heritage: Why the Sexes Differ 
Beyond the general problem of how resource consumption influences 
fertility in different environments, there are sex differences in resource 
striving. In mammals, including humans, male and female patterns differ, 
and behavioral ecology, based as it is on natural selection theory, may help 
us understand where these sex differences come from, and why they con- 
tinue to exist. 
Behavioral ecology views organisms as "packages" of calories to be 
spent and risks to be taken. At any moment, an organism can spend its 
effort on maintaining its soma, or body (somatic effort: thermoregulation, 
eating, metabolizing, etc.); or it might spend reproductive effort, either in 
attracting a mate (mating effort) or in caring for offspring (parental effort). In 
any described environment, some patterns of expenditure will be better 
than others in their effect on survival and reproduction. The allocation of 
somatic and reproductive effort relates to the problems of surviving and 
reproducing relatively better than one's competitors. In most species, it 
pays individuals to specialize in either mating or parental effort--the ben 
haviors that make one successful in mating are often strongly opposed to 
the behaviors that promote parental success (reviewed by Low, 1993a; also 
Daly & Wilson, 1983). In most, but not all, species, mating specialists are 
likely to be male, and parental specialists are likely to be female. 
This specialization has profound implications that are not immediately 
obvious. If one sex specializes in getting mates, and the other in investing 
in offspring, we predict very different sorts of behaviors between the sexes. 
Mating and parental effort show very different "return curves" (Figure 1). 






FIGURE 1. Mating and parental effort have different return curves. Mating 
effort has a high fixed cost, making failure frequent, and great expenditure 
and risk potentially profitable; parental effort has a more linear return and a 
lower maximum. As a result, the behaviors that are most effective in each 
kind of effort are contradictory (modified from Low 1993a). 
Parental Effort 
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Effort Expended or Resources Controlled 
himself as successful before he can get even his first mate, and this is 
typically expensive and risky. However, his reproductive returns continue 
to grow with continued resource acquisition. Parental effort shows a more 
linear return curve: each additional offspring is likely to cost about as 
much as the first. Furthermore, female fertility is more limited than male 
fertility because of this fact. This simple observation has profound impact 
on male, versus female, behavior in most species. Far fewer males than 
females actually reproduce, but the most successful male can have an or- 
der of magnitude more offspring than the most reproductively successful 
female. For example, among elephant seals, over 80% of males fail to re- 
produce; the most reproductive female had 11 offspring in her lifetime, 
while the most successful male had over 90 (LeBoeuf & Reiter, 1988). 
Since males typically experience more variance in reproductive per- 
formance than females, the stakes are higher for them. Since high expendi- 
ture and risk-taking may be profitable, risky behavior and conflict are, in 
polygynous species, male endeavors. As a result, sexual conflicts (more 
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frequently by males in mammals) are more likely to escalate to lethal pro- 
portions than conflicts arising from other sorts of individual selection. Since 
male reproductive variance typically exceeds female reproductive variance 
in humans also (see Low, 1990b), a series of predictions about sex differ- 
ences in risk-taking, promiscuity, and aggressiveness follows. 2 The return 
curve differences for male and female mammals have a profound impact 
on general resource-consumption patterns: males and females experience 
quite different payoffs both for their accumulation of resources and for their 
acceptance of risk. This underlying difference sets the scene for wide- 
spread, predictable sex differences, even across cultures--differences that 
strongly affect fertility and consumption patterns. 
Male Cultural and Reproductive Success: The Influence of Re- 
source Value. When resource-controlling men can have higher fertility 
than others (e.g., through polygyny in bride-price societies), fertility will 
tend to be high but variable. Such conditions obtain in many traditional 
societies and some pre-and proto-industrial societies (e.g., Pfister 1989a; 
b). In fact, in quite a variety of societies, wealth or status and reproductive 
success are positively correlated for men (e.g., Hill, 1984)). Richer Turkmen 
had more wives and more children than poorer men (Irons, 1979). In the 
pastoral Mukogodo of Kenya, wealth enhances men's reproductive success 
(Cronk, 1991a). Similarly, the Meru use livestock for bridewealth, and 
richer men can marry more wives (Fadiman, 1982). In societies as diverse 
as the Hausa (Barkow, 1977), Trinidadians (Flinn, 1986), and Micronesian 
islanders (Turke & Betzig, 1985), status and wealth correlate with male 
reproductive success. 
In some societies, such as the Ache (Hill & Kaplan, 1988; Kaplan & 
Hill, 1985) and the Yanomam~ (Chagnon 1979; 1982; 1988), few physical 
resources are owned; even here, status represents a resource. Among the 
Ache, men who are good hunters not only get more matings than other 
men, but their children survive better (Hill & Kaplan, 1988). In the 
Yanomam~, male kin available for coalitions also represent a resource, and 
men manipulate kinship terms in ways that make more women available 
for mates, and render powerful men available as coalition partners (Chag- 
non, 1982; 1988), so that reproductive success is uneven. Among the 
Yanomam6, the most successful methods of gaining wives are being a 
member of a powerful kin group, and gaining recognition as a revenge- 
killer (Chagnon, 1988; also see below "Sex Differences in Homicide and 
Warfare"). Among the polyandrous Toda, a man's centrality in the kinship 
network is related to his reproductive success (Hughes, 1988). 
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Women's Age: The Importance of Reproductive Value. If the ca- 
pacity to provide resources has been important for men in human evolu- 
tionary history, the critical variable for women appears to have been child- 
producing capacity, or reproductive value. Reproductive value, an index 
derived from age-specific fertility and mortality rates, is defined as the 
probable number of daughters a female will have in the rest of her life, thus 
encompassing age-specific fertility and survivorship functions. In societies 
with bride price or some other exchange of goods at marriage (74 % of the 
Standard Cross-Cultural Sample), younger women are expected to com- 
mand a higher bride price. If high reproductive value is desirable, men 
with greater economic resources may be able to command women with 
higher reproductive value in the marriage market. 
An interesting social dilemma follows. Poor men might choose to 
marry older women with greater resources when they can, explicitly trad- 
ing reproductive value for resource value. Thus in eighteenth and nine- 
teenth century Scandinavia, daughters of upper-middle class men (who 
would marry richer men) were considered marriageable at eighteen years, 
while daughters of poorer men, who would marry poorer men, were not 
considered marriageable until years later, in their mid-to-late twenties 
(Drake, 1969; Low, 1991). Richer men, in marrying younger women, 
gained high reproductive value, but provided resources themselves. 
Hughes (1986) found similar correlations between men's wealth and 
women's reproductive value in England. 
Remarriage for Widows and Widowers. Resources and reproduc- 
tive value interact in remarriage patterns as well. In most societies, widows 
commonly remarry far less frequently than widowers; no obvious sociolog- 
ical or economic explanation exists. When women remarry, they do so at 
younger ages (higher reproductive value) than men; women's probability of 
remarriage declines with age, as reproductive value declines. Classical de- 
mographers (e.g., Knodel, 1981, Knodel & Lynch, 1985) were puzzled by 
such patterns, for women's economic value, like men's, does not decline 
with age. However, women's reproductive value does decline, and the de- 
cline after its peak is a certainty (declining fecundability). 
In many societies, though the pattern can be slightly modified by the 
operant sex ratio (Imhof, 1981), the patterns are quite strong: widows re- 
marry far less frequently than widowers (Akerman, 1981 ; Cabourdin, 1981 ; 
Corsini, 1981; Bideau & Perrenoud, 1981); widows with dependent chil- 
dren remarry at an even lower rate (e.g., Bideau, 1980; Corsini, 1981; 
Bideau & Perrenoud, 1981; Griffith, 1980); and older widows commonly 
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do not remarry at all (e.g., Cabourdin, 1981). These patterns persist in con- 
temporary society (Glick & Lin, 1986; Hill & Low, 1991). Not surprisingly, 
when men remarry, they tend to marry younger women (of higher repro- 
ductive value). This contributes to the greater fertility of men's second mar- 
riages, compared to women's, even in societies with late ages at first mar- 
riage and socially-imposed monogamy. 
Training Boys Versus Girls. The conditions described above repre- 
sent a selective background favoring specific differences in men's and 
women's behavior. We expect strong differences between the sexes across 
cultures (e.g., Whiting & Edwards, 1973; Whiting & Whiting, 1975; Rosen- 
blatt & Cunningham, 1976). Males more frequently than females have suc- 
ceeded by openly and aggressively competing in coalitions for power and 
resource control. We expect men to strive for large amounts of resources, 
to exert overt efforts to change rules, to manipulate rules, and to change 
coalitions. If women have seldom or never been able to profit reproduc- 
tively from such actions, we expect them to behave in ways which will 
maximize the probability of continuance of the current coalition, although 
not to eschew subtle attempts at manipulation. 
It follows that parents should bring up children of the two sexes differ- 
ently, and that these differences should be exaggerated or minimized, de- 
pending on the nature of the society, and thus the likely reproductive con- 
sequences. In particular, we expect that sons will be more strongly trained 
than daughters in behaviors useful in open competition, while daughters 
will be more strongly trained in such values as sexual restraint, obedience, 
and responsibility--traits sought by men in wives. Reexamination of Barry 
et al.'s (1976) cross-cultural data on how boys and girls are trained (Low, 
1989b) suggests that both predictions are true. Further, sons are more 
strongly trained in attributes like aggression and fortitude in those societies 
in which the reproductive stakes are highest (polygynous societies), and 
lowest in rigidly stratified societies, in which individual striving is least 
likely to reap reproductive rewards. 
Across all societies, boys are taught, in early and late childhood, to 
show more fortitude and be more self-reliant than girls (Low, 1989b). Girls 
are taught, in early and late childhood, to be more industrious, responsible, 
obedient, and sexually restrained than boys. The greater the degree of 
polygyny, measured as per cent of men and per cent of women polygy- 
nously married (cf. Low, 1988), the more older boys are taught to show 
fortitude, aggression, and industriousness (Low, 1989b). As the maximum 
harem size allowed increases (cf. Betzig, 1986), so does intensity of train- 
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ing for boys to show fortitude, industriousness, responsibility, and obe- 
dience. 
In our society children themselves quickly show sex differences in per- 
ceptions of dominance and aggression. By age three, boys play in groups 
and play more aggressive games than girls (Freedman, 1974; Omark & 
Edelman, 1976). By age four, boys tend to advertise themselves as toughest 
(Omark & Edelman, 1976); by age six, they have formed dominance hier- 
archies, perceive them accurately, and attempt to manipulate their position 
in them--whi le  girls find the entire question irrelevant! Cross-culturally, 
the more women actually control important resources or exercise power, 
the less daughters are taught to be submissive. For example, the more 
women are able to inherit property, the less daughters are taught to be 
obedient. In societies in which women can hold political office, daughters 
are more strongly inculcated in achievement and striving than in societies 
in which women cannot hold office, although the difference is only mar- 
ginally significant. The more authority women have over children older 
than four, the less daughters are taught to be obedient (Low, 1989b). Thus, 
the behavioral ecology of resource competition predicts important patterns 
of child training across cultures, and specific differences between the 
sexes. 
Abortion, Infanticide, and Abandonment. Patterns in parental ter- 
mination of investment in children, such as abortion or infanticide, are also 
resource related, and show sex differences in most cultures. In nonhuman 
species, it is typically not parents, but reproductive competitors (e.g., males 
taking over a harem), who commit infanticide (Hrdy, 1974; 1978; 1979; 
Packer & Pusey, 1983; 1984). in humans, also, genetic relatedness is im- 
portant; step-parents are more likely to abuse or neglect children than own 
parents (Daly & Wilson, 1984; 1985; 1987). Even when socioeconomic 
factors are taken into consideration, the risk for babies of being killed is 
seventy times as great if the child lives with a step-parent as well as its 
natural parent. Among the Tikopia and the Yanomam6, a man may de- 
mand the death of his new wife's prior children. Such cases dramatically 
reflect the conflict of genetic interests between the parent and the non- 
parent who may be called upon to invest in the children. 
Yet parents do commit infanticide, abortion, and abandonment, under 
specific conditions. Because each infant requires great investment, invest- 
ment biases, even to the extent of infanticide, can be reproductively prof- 
itable. Natural selection can favor termination of investment, depending 
on: mother's ability to invest, mother's access to additional resources (such 
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as family, mate), child's ability to succeed, and the economic and repro- 
ductive value of other existing or future possible children. Crossculturally, 
deformed or seriously ill newborns are at greater risk for infanticide. Sim- 
ilarly, when circumstances reduce a mother's chance of successful invest- 
ment (e.g., too-close births, twins, lack of an investing male), infanticide or 
neglect is more likely (Daly & Wilson, 1988; Bugos & McCarthy, 1984). 
Abortion, too, appears more common in circumstances in which the birth 
of an additional child is likely to reduce the mother's lifetime reproductive 
success. As women age, and their reproductive value declines, termination 
of investment is less likely (Hill & Low, 1991). Even attitudes toward abor- 
tion in our society are related to the proportion of women in any group 
who are "at risk" of unwanted pregnancy (Betzig & Lombardo, 1991). 
In many societies, there is a sex preference in infanticide; however, 
this represents a conundrum if it becomes widespread and persistent, for 
the rare sex comes to be more valuable in any marriage market (Fisher, 
1958, p. 159). In hypergynous societies, in which women may marry "up" 
and men "down," but the reverse is not allowed, daughters are valuable to 
lower-class families, but costly to upper-class families, and infanticide 
tends to be female-biased in high-status families (e.g., Dickemann, 1979). 
It is possible, too, that (otherwise rare) male-biased infanticide occurred in 
high-status families (Parry, 1979). 
Historical studies of child abandonment also reflect such selective 
considerations as a mother's ability to invest in the child (including own 
health, familial resources, economic conditions), and the child's health, 
legitimacy, and sex. Child abandonment in historical France (Fuchs, 1984), 
Spain (Sherwood, 1988), and Russia (Ransel, 1988) was related to eco- 
nomic factors, child's condition, and mother's abilities. Similarly, in Bos- 
well's (1990) well-known historical overview of child abandonment 77% 
(49/63) of his cases were related to maternal ability to invest and offspring 
quality. Perhaps the other side of the coin is represented by adoption-- 
taking care of someone else's child. Crossculturally, when someone adopts 
a nonrelated child, most often it is a poorer, or lower-status family offering 
to care for the child of a richer, more powerful lineage. 
Voland (1984) examined the effect of father's status on children's sur- 
vival in a nineteenth-century German parish. The overall sex ratio of chil- 
dren born was almost exactly even; the effect of mother's age was not 
analyzed. Deaths during the first yeai" of life due to parental neglect were 
status-related: for farmers, daughters were likely to be considered less de- 
sirable than sons; for other classes, the reverse appeared to be true. Voland 
thus has evidence of uneven parental investment tied to the perceived 
value of each sex for parents in different classes. In a similar sample from 
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nineteenth century Sweden, I found (Low 1991; 1994b) no bias in the birth 
sex ratios of children born to richer versus poorer men, but a very strong 
sex bias in investment by rich men versus poor men; both kinds of fathers 
produced more rich sons than rich daughters--but poor men dramatically 
funneled their (more limited) resources into sons. 
Sex-Biased Inheritance. Because resource control is an effective and 
widespread strategy for men in acquiring mates, sex biases in resource 
inheritance are important; they can influence survivorship and likelihood 
of reproduction. Perhaps no other species exhibits the degree of resource 
transfer that can take place through inheritance within human families. 
Inheritance is frequently biased by sex, legitimacy, and birth order. 
In societies with heritable goods, the size of a family and the sex of 
siblings may differentially influence men's and women's ability to marry at 
appropriatet imes. Within polygynous marital systems, inheritance is 
strikingly male-biased (Hartung, 1982), precisely the pattern predictable if 
male reproductive success varies more than female reproductive success, 
and male success is influenced by resource control. In many societies, ear- 
lier-born sons tend to inherit the greatest proportion of the resources, even 
where more equal distribution is stipulated by law (e.g., nineteenth century 
Sweden). There is evidence of such influences at work in societies as di- 
verse as medieval Portugal, nineteenth century Sweden, and the contem- 
porary United States (Low, t991; Boone, 1986; 1988; Abernethey & Yip, 
199O). 
Sex Differences in Homicide and Warfare. Lethal conflict is an 
extreme form of striving. Behavioral ecology predicts that possibly-lethal 
conflict will occur when the potential reproductive rewards (mates, status, 
resources for mates) are high; and that, within mammals, males will more 
often be in a position to gain than females (Manson & Wrangham, 1991; 
Alexander, 1987; Low, 1993b). Sexual selection (in competition over 
mates) and kin selection (in infanticide and intergroup conflicts; Shaw, 
1985; Shaw & Wong, 1989) are the driving forces. 
Coalitions of males in nonhuman mammals are riskier, more aggres- 
sive, and more often among nonrelatives than coalitions among females 
(Low, 1990a; 1993b). Females' conflicts center on food or parental re- 
sources, while males' conflicts are likely to center on the acquisition of 
mates. Because of these patterns, the reproductive impact of conflict for 
male mammals may be many times greater than that for females. Thus it is 
not surprising that aggression over resources is one of the most consistent 
sex differences across cultures (Ember, 1981; Barry et al., 1976; Low, 
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1989b), and homicides are principally a male endeavor (Daly & Wilson, 
1988). Crossculturally, men can make enormous direct reproductive gains 
with access to power, status, and great amounts of resources, but it is not 
clear to what extent women can do so (above); this parallels the reproduc- 
tive ecology of resource control and status in other polygynous species. In 
the few societies in which women wield substantial public power, as op- 
posed to informal influence, they evidence no clear reproductive gain. In 
fact, in some of the examples, it is apparent that there is a conflict between 
political and direct reproductive gain for women. In matrilineal and double 
descent systems, women's power appears to accrue to their sons, who may 
reap reproductive benefit (Trivers, 1985; Low, 1992). In summary, through 
evolutionary history men have been able to gain reproductively by warring 
behavior; women almost never have been able to do so. 
It is important to note that the argument does not hinge on sexual size 
dimorphism in humans--the fact that men are generally bigger and stronger 
than women. Even in ungulate species like red deer, in which status and 
resource control are mediated through physical combat, and there is no 
evidence of reciprocal "political" alliances, size is not the only determinant 
of status (e.g., Clutton-Brock et al., 1982). In primate species, and in hu- 
man societies, the social complexities so far outweigh the impact of physi- 
cal size that size alone is a poor predictor of success. Similarly, this argu- 
ment does not reduce to an assertion that women are bound by the 
constraints of pregnancy, nursing and child care. If that were true, sterile 
women and postmenopausal women might broadly be expected to engage 
in intergroup conflict, as do other primate females. 
Sexual dimorphism in use of resources and power in reproduction is 
the critical factor. Men appear to seek direct reproductive gain (e.g., steal- 
ing wives) in intergroup conflict, while women, when they are (rarely) in- 
volved, seek resources for themselves and their offspring. Sometimes this is 
accomplished through indirect or informal influence and nepotistic gain. 
Most commonly, the amount of resources controlled by women is just suf- 
ficient to support their family, although sometimes, particularly in ma- 
trilineal and duolineal societies (Low, 1993b), women may gain for their 
families. These societies, like the Cherokee and perhaps the Ashanti, are 
also those in which there is an occasional woman warrior. 
[3] Levels of Selection: Why We Are Not Environmental or 
Population Altruists 
A behavioral ecological perspective highlights a seldom-noted but 
crucial fact: only behaviors that enhance the success of a genetic lineage 
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(such as behaviors which are selfish, parental, nepotistic, or reciprocal) can 
evolve by natural selection. "Genetic altruists" (those who, to their cost 
and others' benefit, restrict or cease reproduction, like the Shakers) decline 
in the population, being replaced by individuals that behave to their own 
reproductive benefit, as Darwin himself recognized (Darwin, 1859, p. 
260). 
Cultural (as opposed to natural) selection can give rise to celibacy, 
suicide, and other reproductively unprofitable patterns. Because cultural 
patterns can be passed not only directly to descendants, but to any others 
who are interested, ideas and culturally-promoted behaviors can spread in 
very different patterns from genetically-transmitted traits (Boyd & Richer- 
son, 1985; Williams, 1992). Nothing prohibits the occurrence of a Mother 
Teresa or the Shakers with their rules of celibacy, but they are nonetheless 
unlikely to become or remain a majority of any population. Similarly, envi- 
ronmental strategies that require broad compliance and that carry an indi- 
vidual cost (or perceived cost) will have a difficult time. 
To conservationists, the most familiar "levels of selection" problem is 
probably the "tragedy of the commons" (e.g., Hardin, 1968). In most cases, 
these situations involve resources to which all have access (and which, if 
destroyed, will hurt all), but which give short-term individual profit to those 
who exploit them. Typically, when many unrelated individuals simul- 
taneously have common access to resources, whether the resources are 
grazing lands or whale populations, they tend to exploit the resource more 
than is wise from the community's longterm perspective, in order to gain 
personally. There are common-pool resource groups that manage their re- 
sources sustainably, over long periods of t ime--but they are typically small 
homogeneous groups, of stable (often kin-based) membership, with low 
wealth stratification (e.g., Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom, Gardner, & Walker, 
1992). In such groups the payoff for cheating on other group members is 
low, the benefits of a good reputation are high, and the rewards for defec- 
tion are limited (see Ostrom, Walker, & Gardner, 1992). The difficulty, as 
we look at large-scale problems that have some characteristics of com- 
mons, is that we cannot expect the sort of group-beneficial behavior that 
characterizes small kin groups to hold in large, heterogeneous groups. The 
larger, more diverse, and more fluid a group, the less one can count on 
convergence of individual and group interests to give us longterm sustain- 
able behavior. 
A popular normative approach is to suggest that we convince our- 
selves to live less consumptively (e.g., "Live Simply, That Others May Sim- 
ply Live"). This was the dominant strategy of the 1970s environmental 
movement and has considerable support today, but I suggest that there are 
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strong theoretical reasons not to be sanguine about its effectiveness. Nor- 
mative approaches rest on the assumption that we are will ing to see our 
individual interests as converging with the interests of our larger group; and 
as 1 just noted, the conditions under which this assumption holds are lim- 
ited. Many large-scale environmental problems should be rare if this as- 
sumption were true. 
Can we extend reciprocity towards these environmental ends? No spe- 
cies has developed reciprocity to the extent humans have. Yet selection 
cannot favor individuals who act for the benefit of a group of nonrelatives 
at the expense of their own inclusive fitness; only behaviors which en- 
hance reproductive success (such as behaviors which are selfish, parental, 
reciprocal, or help relatives and therefore enhance inclusive fitness) can 
evolve by natural selection. Many apparently reciprocal behaviors are in 
fact exploitation (e.g., Connor, 1995). Situations in which the costs are paid 
by individuals other than those gaining the rewards are unstable. 
Behavioral ecology leads to a number of predictions: we expect re- 
source control and consumption to be positively correlated under most 
conditions; we expect individuals to act in their own self-interest (though 
this is not always "self-interest" in the narrow economic sense; see Low, 
1993a for review). It is not that altruistic behaviors will never occur; it is 
just that, because they cannot spread by natural selection, they wil l  be 
rare. Thus, we expect only a small proportion of a population wil l ingly to 
choose bicycles over Miatas, when both are available and affordable for 
the individual. Behavioral ecological theory suggests that normative ap- 
proaches to both fertility and consumption decisions are likely to convince 
only a small fraction of people. When people are asked to do things that 
cost them individually in the short term, no matter how laudable and rea- 
sonable, there is considerable defection. Simply asking for altruism just has 
not worked as a widespread strategy. We still do not seem to have a clear 
idea of which strategies will work relatively well under what circumstances 
(Low & Heinen, 1993), but this is an obvious area for fruitful research. 
[4] Novel Evolutionary Environments 
In other species and in preindustrial human societies for which we 
have sufficient data, individuals who have more resources typically have 
greater reproductive success. But we live in a novel world, largely of our 
own making. Now, with birth control, we have broken the link between 
resource accumulation and inclusive fitness. If we evolved, like other or- 
ganisms, to strive for resources for ourselves and our families, one powerful 
corollary is that we typically derive proximate rewards of satisfaction and 
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pleasure from that struggle. What we perceive has always been some prox- 
imate cue like pleasure or pride, although the reason the behavior persisted 
(or died out) was its effect on inclusive fitness. Whenever some behavior 
has an evolutionary history of reproductive advantage, and conditions 
change ("novel evolutionary events"), there is a possibility for that behavior 
to continue be driven by proximate cues that in the past correlated with 
reproductive advantage, even when the proximate cues are currently un- 
hinged from that functional advantage. 
Because no organism, including humans, has evolved to be aware of 
ultimate selective effect, but only of proximate cues, selection acts so that 
those things which enhance our survivorship or reproduction--forming 
friendships, having sex--tend to be perceived ("proximate cues") as plea- 
surable, and acts which typically detract from our survivorship or repro- 
duction--getting burned--are perceived as unpleasant or painful. Novelty 
complicates this process. For example, in nature, sweet foods are seldom 
harmful, while sour and bitter tastes often indicate the presence of harmful 
alkaloids. Thus a preference for sweet tastes became widespread in omni- 
vores, including humans. In natural situations, it was difficult to obtain 
sufficient sugar without other nutrients and fiber, to create problems of 
obesity. However, once we humans invented technologies for refining and 
concentrating sugar, we created foods that had enormous concentrations of 
sugar, breaking the selective link between sweet taste--the proximate 
cue--and good food source that led to enhanced survivorship and repro- 
duction. But proximate cues drive the system, and selection simply filters 
out alternatives. So, today we retain a preference for sweet taste that can 
be counter-adaptive (health risks, and perhaps sexual selection). 
We humans may well be in precisely the same situation with regard to 
the use and conservation of resources. Natural selection has shaped all 
l iving organisms (including humans) to exploit resources effectively, in 
competition with each other; our problem is that we are so good at i t - -  
through our cleverness, we have created a novel evolutionary circum- 
stance; we have such technology that the very behaviors we evolved to 
perform are those likely to ruin us. 
POPULATION, CONSUMPTION, AND ENVIRONMENT 
The above data and patterns suggest several things. First, humans, like 
all other species, have evolved to strive to increase their individual re- 
source consumption so long as it has shown reproductive payoffs. Because 
we live in a novel environment (Low & Heinen, 1993) with high techno- 
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logical efficiency, the striving we evolved to do can in fact destroy the 
environment we live in, both locally and even, perhaps, globally. Yet in the 
evolutionary history of humans, selection appears to have been direc- 
t i ona l -one  never had too many resources. Like sugar in the natural envi- 
ronment, all one could get was always best. 
Other things being equal, the family lines of more fertile individuals in 
any species become a greater proportion of any population than those of 
less fertile individuals. In other species, two conditions lead to lower fertil- 
ity: [1] harsh environmental conditions, in which individuals cannot 
achieve the conditions necessary for successful reproduction, and [2] 
highly competitive (often rich) environments, in which only well-invested 
superkids can become successful. 3 
Here is a clue, I think, to the diversity in patterns of fertility decline in 
the developing world. In today's environment, fertility is low in situations 
parallel to the two conditions for other species: [1] resources are so re- 
stricted that women's fertility declines and mortality increases, or [2] in- 
tense consumption of (often relatively rich) resources enhance children's 
success. The impacts on the environment of these two very different kinds 
of low fertility are quite different; and neither low fertility nor low con- 
sumption alone will necessarily lead to sustainability. This is why increased 
consumption so often accompanies reduced fertility. 
Intellectually, we can perhaps see danger in continuing to strive for 
maxima, but there is likely to be considerable inertia; it may be difficult to 
convince ourselves in large numbers to "live simply" when consuming 
more yields more resources and often more status. The two sexes have 
different return curves for these activities. Women's resource use in tradi- 
tional societies has been low-risk, low-but-predictable return, and thus 
more sustainable than men's high-risk, high-gain resource striving. If we 
could harness these evolved sex differences could we enhance sus- 
tainability? The data suggest it may prove difficult. The major ecological 
factor selecting for lowered fertility today, increased competitiveness in the 
environment, brings with it selection for increased per capita consumption. 
Both fertil ity and consumption contribute to unsustainable conditions. 
Thus, there is likely to be no easy answer to the question of how to pro- 
mote both lower fertility and lower consumption. 
Answering questions about the relationships among fertility and con- 
sumption, fertility and sustainability, and consumption and sustainability is 
difficult for several reasons, over and above the complexity of the relation- 
ships. Two major categories of difficulties are that inappropriate data are 
applied to questions, and that answers to quite different questions are inap- 
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propriately seen as alternative answers to the same question. For example, 
revisit for a moment the relationship between wealth and fertility discussed 
above. First, using GNP per capita and TFR (e.g., Birdsall, t980), whatever 
it tells us, has nothing whatever to say about the kind of within-population 
variation that is measured for theoretical arguments. Yet these data are of- 
ten cited as showing a general negative relationship between wealth and 
fertility, even though they are inappropriate for that question. 
As an example of the second difficulty, how can it be true that both 
wealthy, well-educated women (Kasarda et al., 1986) and women on wel- 
fare have lower-than-average fertility? In fact, both findings are true, simply 
because fertility is not linearly related to wealth for women, and because 
the conflict for women between (economic) production and reproduction, 
discussed above, is not identical when women earn their own wealth (as in 
both examples here), and when they are simply married to wage earners-- 
and published comparisons do not take that fact into account (see Low, 
1993a; Low & Clarke, 1993). In fact, wealth-ferti l ity relationships for 
women will not be appropriately analyzed until we have data separating 
the fertility of women who earn their own wealth from women married to 
men who provide wealth. The obvious prediction is that the highest fertility 
wil l be shown by nonworking women married to wealthy men (e.g., as in 
Daly & Wilson, 1983, Figure 12-5; or Low, 1990b). 
WOMEN, FERTILITY, AND 
CONSUMPTION IN DEVELOPING NATIONS 
In traditional human societies, as among other primates, men's re- 
source acquisition, directed largely toward mating effort, tended to be 
high-risk, high-gain, while women's resource acquisition tended to be low- 
risk, low-return, more sustainable--simply enough for herself and her 
healthy offspring. In the developing world, as competition for resources 
becomes more severe, and the effectiveness of monetary parental invest- 
ment in helping children increases, the result is likely to be greater invest- 
ment per child and a shift for women to market participation. In many 
societies, the conflict between work and parental investment capability 
may be even sharper for women than for men. Turke (1989) has argued 
that, as family and kinship networks are weakened (e.g., by spatial disrup- 
tion), fertility falls. In these cases, older children and non-descendant rela- 
tives comprise a resource (nepotistic effort); when that resource declines, 
fertility is likely to fall. When monetary resources become central to chil- 
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dren's success, women may shift from traditional maternal investment pat- 
terns to market employment, typically with additional negative impact on 
fertility. 
If the story ended there, we might face no sustainability problems. 
However, since the impetus to lower fertility is higher per capita invest- 
ment in children, this pattern has a positive impact on per capita consump- 
tion. The investment level required to produce successful offspring varies 
with environment and specifically with the threshold level of investment 
required for a child's success--often a correlate of competition, and in this 
sense, precisely analogous to the proper use of the concept of r- and K-se- 
lection. This can differ for parents in the same society. If poorer parents 
cannot substantially enhance their children's success, then we might ex- 
pect what was once called "Mediterranean" investment, with larger fami- 
lies, concentration of resources in one or a few children, with others living 
with the family or leaving early (behavioral ecologists would call this an 
"alternate strategies" situation). Parents of high socioeconomic status might 
do better by investing more per child to allow them to be competitive with 
their peers (e.g., education, clothing, status acquisitions). The required in- 
vestment may limit the number of children they can afford. Within sub- 
groups, however, those with more than sufficient resources may be able to 
support additional children and still have all adequately invested (e.g., 
Hughes, 1988; Low & Clarke, 1992; 1993). 
The burden of providing enhanced investment for children typically 
involves women joining the work force, and in competitive markets, gain- 
ing more education to do so (e.g., McClamrock, this volume). Lowered 
fertility in this context means better infant and maternal survivorship--but 
also that increased consumption will likely follow. 
EVOLVED SEX DIFFERENCES 
AND WESTERN SOCIETY 
In other species, and across human cultures, there is a sexual dimor- 
phism in resource acquisition, control, and use, and the pattern is that 
predicted by behavioral ecology. Men compete to control resources in or- 
der to get wives, and form coalitions with both relatives and nonrelatives; 
women compete to acquire resources to feed dependents, and form coali- 
tions mainly with other members of the household. This is an obvious over- 
simplification; humans have elaborated the art of coalitions to a degree 
unknown in any other species; nepotism and coalitions can persist after the 
death of major participants; in many societies men can control the repro- 
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ductive destinies of not only their mates, but other female relatives, and so 
on. Nonetheless, the general pattern is clear, and ecological correlates ex- 
ist. 
Today, in western industrialized nations, women have great actual re- 
source control; in some less developed nations (e.g., west Africa) women 
also control important resources. Women spend money earned jointly and 
by men, as well as money they themselves earn; women can inherit prop- 
erty. While women may be neither as numerous or as powerful as men in 
larger political arenas, they can hold political posts. Under past conditions, 
and in preindustrial societies, women did not profit reproductively from 
risky competition for great gains in resources and status, while men did 
(above). In our own society, the link between power/resources and repro- 
ductive success may well be weakened (see review by Low, 1993a). 
Can the evolved sex differences be brought into service, towards the 
ends of sustainability? Today, investment in fewer high-quality offspring, 
rather than production of many, may be the strongest reproductive strategy 
(see also Rogers, 1992). In our society, having children does not help ac- 
crue resources, as it may have in some preindustrial societies. Infant and 
child mortality are low, and resources are typically divided through wills 
among children. Thus, the strategy of resource accumulation and family 
limitation is liable to remain strong.Under these conditions of low fertility 
and high per capita consumption, women's access to resources and power 
may enhance family resources without a serious cost to net reproductive 
fitness--though women's accrual of resources in market economies clearly 
has net fertility costs (e.g., Kasarda, et al. 1986). 
The difficulty those of us in the evolutionary fields see is that, rather 
than men becoming more like women in resource use, seeking sustainable 
levels of resources, enough to raise physically healthy children, the issue of 
competitiveness of the environment, I suspect, wil l lead women to act 
more like men have in past environments, seeking wealth, power, and sta- 
tus as proximate rewards for striving in a low-fertility society--resources, 
like Everest, to be mastered because they are there. Thus, what many of us 
working in this area find distressing is that as fertility falls, world markets 
emerge, technology advances, and women compete in the same urban 
market places as men, women's consumption patterns begin to look more 
like men's (though this is not well-documented; work needs to be done). 
Simplistic pleas for lower consumption are unlikely to work better in indus- 
trial societies when directed at women than at men. In an evolutionarily 
novel environment, this may not be surprising, but it may become prob- 
lematic. 
An array of strategies are used in the developed world to convince 
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ourselves to reduce our per capita consumption: exhortation, information 
about consequences, manipulation of social costs and benefits for different 
consumption behaviors, and manipulation of economic and legal costs and 
benefits. We are still in the very early stages of finding effective matches for 
strategies and problems (Low & Heinen, 1993). Strategies include [a] ex- 
hortation to "do the Right Thing," information about costs and benefits 
most likely to work when benefits and costs accrue to the same individ- 
uals, without great time lag); and [b] manipulation of costs (e.g., taxes, 
"polluter-pays" laws) and benefits (tax breaks and subsidies). It seems likely 
to be very difficult to get easy agreement on just what constitutes appropri- 
ate resource-consumption behavior (the levels of selection problem above, 
leading to individuals seeking to externalize the costs of their consump- 
tion). With regard to specifics of particular strategies that are effective for 
women, we face an entirely new challenge. In arenas such as this, we seek 
the proximate correlates of success, and the most useful work will come 
not from behavioral ecology, but from sociology and psychology. 
ENDNOTES 
1. The behavioral ecology of fertility has many echoes in a set of demographic arguments: 
various " individual decision" and "proximate variables" demographic models (e.g., 
Becket, 1981 ; Becker and Lewis, 1974; Easterlin, 1978; Tilly, 1978; Lindert, 1978; Simon, 
1974; Lesthaeghe and Wilson, 1986), to Mosk's {1983) "leveraging" approach to inter- 
preting fertility behavior, and to Easterlin and Crimmins's (1985) models of the factors 
favoring a shift to conscious control of fertility (reviewed by Low et al 1992). All have two 
important characteristics: individuals are not assumed to be uniform, and there is an 
explicit tradeoff between quantity and "quality" of children. An additional merit of such 
models may be that they are very general, applicable to all sexually-reproducing organ- 
isms, and not particular to one or another society or to one or another currency. 
2. Several of these are problems for which sociology has no guidance, while behavioral and 
evolutionary approaches offer clear and testable theory: sex-preferential infanticide 
(Dickemann 1979); sex ratio and resources (Voland 1990); sex differences in reproduction 
and striving (Low 1988, 1990b), including the difference in remarriage rates between 
widows and widowers (Low 1991), and how wealth affects the lifetime reproduction of 
men versus women (Low and Clarke 1992); birth order and parental investment (Boone 
1988); how Fisher's concept of reproductive value influences men's as opposed to 
women's reproductive choices (Low 1991); how interbirth interval and sex of child might 
be related (Low 1991). 
3. Behavioral ecological arguments are based on the relative reproductive costs and benefits 
of individuals; they do not require that a specific gene be postulated as underlying any 
behavior. Rather, behavioral ecologists ask: Under what environmental conditions does a 
behavior arise and persist? Who does it? Whom does it profit? What is its impact on each 
individual's lineage success? Even in the case of many simple behaviors, selection has 
apparently operated on complexes of loci, many of which affect other behaviors. External 
environment and genes interact during development in a complex way. For many impor- 
tant behaviors, behavioral ecologists cannot specify the genetic loci involved (e.g., Grafen 
1984); they study the correlations between the trait and environmental conditions. Often 
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one can make powerful and unexpected predictions from these correlations, using selec- 
tion theory (e.g., see Krebs/Davies 1991; Daly/Wilson 1983). 
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